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Abstract—Recently, the specifications of the fifth generation
(5G) of mobile networks have been released witnessing the
industrial interest around the novel network slicing concept.
This context is further enriched by the evolution of an emerging
type of public cloud environment: the Slice-as-a-Service (SlaaS).
Infrastructure providers or network operators deploy different
admission strategy while processing network slice requests issued
by infrastructure tenants based on service level agreements
(SLAs) and current (and predicted) resource availability.
However, when the service demand will reasonably get dense,
congestions of slice requests may occur leading to long waiting
periods. This may turn into impatient tenant behaviors that mit-
igate potential loss. This paper studies the rational strategies of
impatient tenants waiting in queue-based slice admission control
system, proving mathematically and empirically the benefits of
allowing infrastructure provider to share its information with the
upcoming tenants.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging technology of network slicing identified as
the main enhancement [1] of the fifth generation of mobile
networks (5G) enables infrastructure providers and mobile
network operators (MNOs) to abstract (radio, transport and
computational) resources in the form of logically independent
“network slices”. Such network slices may be tailored onto
customized service types with highly specific requirements,
e.g., low-latency, high reliability, high mobility, ect. This
breaks down the barriers of an old monolithic business model
based only on CAPital EXpenditure (CAPEX) and OPerating
EXpenditure (OPEX) savings by allowing MNOs to lease
network slices to infrastructure tenants while, at the same time,
augmenting economic revenues and maximizing the network
resource efficiency. [2] This emerging business case is known
as “Slice as a Service” (SlaaS) [3] and may significantly
benefit vertical segments, such as automotive, e-health or over-
the-top applications that do not own network infrastructures to
deliver advanced services to their customers.
Differing from conventional cloud environments such as
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) [4] or Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(IaaS) [5], the entities to be rent in SlaaS, i.e., the net-
work slices, can be highly heterogeneous in resource require-
ments and dynamic behavior. For instance, massive Machine-
Type-Communications (mMTC) slices for Internet-of-Things
(IoT) applications require dense wireless accesses but only
limited throughput, and are usually created/released at low
frequency. In contrast, enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB)
slices for high-speed transmission need high throughput for
medium amount of accesses, and can be created/released very
dynamically to match the traffic load. This challenges the
network management and orchestration system [6], calling
for intelligent slice brokers [7] and efficient slice admission
control (SAC) [8], in order to optimize the network resource
utilization.
The literature provides an extended overview about network
slicing orchestration solutions pursuing network efficiency
maximization or revenue maximization. For e.g. the authors
in [9] present a near-optimal solution to dynamically allocate
resources amongst slices based on a weighted proportionally
fair objective that guarantees desirable fairness and protection
across the slices. Another recent work [10] models the slicing
orchestration problem as a congestion game with a distributed
solution. Differently, our work proposes to leverage the in-
trinsic tenant behaviors when a consistent number of network
slice requests reach the network. This allows us to propose a
practical tenant-based admission control strategy, making it as
the first one of its kind.
In particular, a SAC module conditionally declines some
tenant requests for network slices to mitigate resource overload
making declined requests to be reconsidered for admission
after a certain delay. A straightforward solution for delivering
such delayed service is queuing system employed as the “First-
Come First-Serve” policy. However, when the service demand
is dense, slice congestions can occur and most requests will
suffer from an over-length waiting time in the queue. In this
case, waiting tenants may behave impatiently to avoid potential
business deficits. In this paper, we study the business model
of tenants in SlaaS environment, to show i) how they shall
behave in case of slice-request competition and subsequent
congestion and ii) which knowledge do they need to make
rational (and efficient) decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
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tion II sets up the SlaaS model with multi-queued SAC and
tenant business model. Section III investigates on the rational
strategies of impatient 5G network slice tenants in congested
queues. Analytical results are then demonstrated and evaluated
in Section IV though numerical simulations. We close the
paper with our conclusion and outlook in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Feasibility and Admissibility
A MNO with limited resource pool r = [r1, r2, . . . , rM ]T
offers a number of tenants with slices of N different predefined
types to rent. Every active slice under maintenance occupies
a certain resource bundle un = [u1,n, u2,n, . . . , uM,n]T w.r.t. its
type n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The active slice set s = [s1, s2, . . . , sM ]T
is subjected to the constraint of resource pool, which defines
the feasibility region S:
S = {s|rm − am ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ m ≤ M}, (1)
where the assigned resources am is defined by
a = [a1, a2, . . . , aM ]T = U × s; (2)
U = [u1, u2, . . . , uN ]. (3)
Clearly, some slice sets s ∈ S can sufficiently utilize the
resource pool so that no admission of new slice is possible,
regardless of the slice type. In other cases, the MNO is able
to admit at least one new slice with its idle resources, which
introduces the admissibility region A:
A = {s|s ∈ S, ∃n : s + ∆sn ∈ S}, (4)
where ∆sn is the unit slice incremental vector of type n:
∆sn = [0, . . . , 0︸  ︷︷  ︸
n−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸  ︷︷  ︸
N−n
], n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (5)
Fig. 1 briefly illustrates the concepts of S and A with an
example where M = 2, N = 2.
Fig. 1: The network resource utilization can be described with
the set of active slices s, which always falls in the feasibility
region S. The admissibility region A is a proper subset of S.
B. Slice Admission Control with Heterogeneous Multi-Queue
Generally, a variety of tenants independently and randomly
issue service requests to the MNO. As indicated by many
existing works [3], [11]–[13], the MNO may decline some
request instead of admitting them immediately, taking account
of both the resource feasibility and prediction of the future
load. In this case, a mechanism is needed to allow the MNO
to reevaluate the declined requests and deliver a delayed slice
admission. In this paper we consider a slice admission control
mechanism with N queues, where every issued request for
slice type n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} will enter and wait in the nth
queue. Only the first awaiting request in every queue can
be considered by the MNO for potential admission. Upon
admission, the request will be removed from the queue.
When there is more than one queue non-empty, multiple
requests of different slice types are simultaneously available
for the MNO’s decision. In this case, we consider that the
MNO has a certain preference among different slice types,
which can be described by a vector ϕ:
A
ϕ(s)→ Φ, (6)
where Φ is the set of all permutations of {1, 2, . . . , N}. The
order of elements in ϕ presents the MNO’s preference. More
specifically, every change in either the status of queues or
s triggers the MNO to attempt admitting the first request in
its most preferred queue. If this attempt fails due to resource
constraint or an empty queue, the MNO continues with its next
preferred queue. Once a request is admitted, both s and the
queues status, and therefore the MNO’s preference as well, are
updated, which triggers the aforementioned procedure again.
This process continues recursively until no more awaiting
request can be accepted by the MNO, thereafter the MNO
waits for the next incoming request (that updates the queues
status) or slice termination (that updates s).
It is also worth to note that sometimes the MNO may want
to reserve its resource for future utilization, despite that it is
able to admit another slice. This can be enabled by adding
an option 0 for “standby” to the preference vector. In this
case, Φ should be extended to the set of all permutations of
{0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. A graphical summary of the aforementioned
mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 2. We refer to the specific
mapping ϕ(s) as the admission strategy of the MNO.
As service requests are issued by a number of independent
tenants, it is reasonable to consider the request arrival of every
certain slice type as an independent Poisson process.
C. Tenant Business Model
Having introduced the SAC mechanism from the MNO’s
perspective, now we take the tenant’s point of view and
consider the business model of every tenant service instance
through its life cycle.
Generally, the motivation of tenants to request network
slices is to fulfill the end-user service demands from their own
customers. For simplification, here we consider w.l.o.g. that for
every certain tenant, every service demand can be supported
Fig. 2: A heterogeneous multi-queue mechanism can be imple-
mented to enable delayed slice admission, in which a specific
preference among different slice types is addressed to every
state of active slice set.
by one slice of the same type. Once a tenant is granted with
the requested network slice, it launches its business session
to deliver service to the end-users. The duration of a business
session, i.e. the lifetime of the corresponding network slice,
is a random variable, that is known by the tenant before
issuing the slice request and established in the Service-Level-
Agreement (SLA) upon slice admission.
It can take the tenant a one-time cost c0 to issue the service
request to the MNO, which is used to issue the request and
prepare the end-user service. Besides, this cost may also covers
part (or even the whole lump) of the rent for requested network
slice, which the MNO may also requires the tenants to prepay
as deposit in advance. Additionally, when a request waits in
queue, it can consistently generate a periodical waiting cost c
for the tenant, which is used to keep the tenant standby for
launching the business session.
Once a request is accepted, a new network slice will be
created and granted to the corresponding tenant to support
the desired end-user service. This service is supposed to
generate a periodic revenue Rev that we assume as known
or well predictable by the tenant. Meanwhile, the tenant has
to pay a periodical expenditure Exp that is composed by the
operations cost to maintain the service, and the residential rent
for the network slice in case that the rent is not completely
prepaid to the MNO in the request-issuing phase. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that the periodical profit
p = Rev−Exp is positive – as the tenant will never issue such
a request otherwise.
D. Impatience of Tenants
The longer a request waits in queue, the more waiting cost
the tenant pays. In the extreme case, this cost can exceed
the total profit that can be generated by the requested slice
through its entire lifetime. Therefore, a rational tenant will
choose to cancel its request for slice, when it expects to lose
by keep waiting. Such impatient behavior commonly exists
in various queuing systems, and has been extensively studied
in the fields of queuing theory and operations research [14],
[15]. Generally, there are two forms of impatient behavior in
queues:
1) Balking: A tenant may give up issuing a request, if
it considers the current request queue as overlength, which
implies a probably long waiting time.
2) Reneging: Having issued a request and and waited in
queue for a while, a tenant may have a pessimistic expectation
of the remaining waiting time, thereby give up waiting and
cancel its request without being served.
Different models have been proposed to describe the statis-
tical features of these phenomena, such as the linear balking
model [16], the hyperbolic balking model [17], the exponen-
tial balking model [15] and the exponential reneging model
[17]. However, it remains unclear in the context of SlaaS
environment, which model applies the best – or even more
fundamentally – if any of them applies. Furthermore, to the
best of our knowledge, it has not been clearly stated yet,
how each individual tenant request behaves in its queue, or
what kind of information is essential for the tenant to make
appropriate decision. In the next section of this paper, we
attempt to address these problems.
III. RATIONAL BALKING & RENEGING STRATEGIES
An arbitrary request can be characterized by a feature vector
[n, c0, c, p, τq], where n is the slice type, τ is the expected life
time of slice upon acceptance, c0, c and p are the business
model parameters discussed in Section II-C. Meanwhile, the
queue of slice type n can be characterized by [l, λ, µ] where
l − 1 is its current queue length, λ and µ are the arrival rate
and serving rate of type-n requests, respectively.
When the business demand arises, i.e. request is generated
(not issued yet) by the tenant, the expected total profit that
this business session can generate is
E{P} = pτ. (7)
Meanwhile, the expected cost of issuing the request and
waiting in the queue till acceptance is
E{C} = c0 + cE{wl}, (8)
where wk is the time a request must wait in queue until being
accepted with k − 1 other requests ahead of it.
Assume that the tenants can obtain the a priori knowledge
about wl , self-evidently, a rational tenant will propose the
request if and only if E{P − C} ≥ 0, which can be described
as a binary decision model:
Db =
{
1 pτ − c0 − cE{wl} ≥ 0;
0 otherwise,
(9)
where Db = 1 stands for issuing and Db = 0 for balking.
A. Rational Balking without Reneging
For simplification, we first ignore reneging, so that
E{wl} = l
µ
, (10)
Db =
{
1 τ ≥ c0µ+clµp
0 otherwise
. (11)
Hence, given certain p, c0 and c, it yields that Db = Db(l, τ)
if the tenant is able to observe l before pushing its request into
the queue. The balking chance of such a tenant is therefore a
function of l under any certain distribution of τ:
b(l) =
∫ +∞
0
Db(l, t) fτ(t)dt =
∫ +∞
c0µ+cl
µp
fτ(t)dt
= 1 − Fτ
(
c0µ + cl
µp
) (12)
Particularly, when c0 = 0 and τ ∼ U(0, τmax ):
buni(l) =
{
1 − clµpτmax 0 ≤ l ≤
µpτmax
c ;
0 otherwise,
(13)
which is the linear balking model in [16]. Note that there is
an implicit limit for the queue length lmax =
µpτmax
c , even if no
such limit is explicitly set by the MNO.
When c0 = 0 and fτ(t) = 1(t+1)2 (rational distribution):
brat(l) = 1 −
(
− 1
t + 1
) clµp
t=0
=
µp
cl + µp
=
µp
c
l + µpcr
. (14)
When c0 = 0 and τ ∼ Par(1, 1):
bpar(l) =

1 l = 0;
1 −
(
− 1t
) clµp
t=1
=
µp
c
l otherwise
, (15)
which is the hyperbolic balking model in [17] with the factor
of patience β = µpc . Note that this model assumes every slice
remains active for at least an unit time period.
When c0 = 0 and τ ∼ Exp(η):
bexp(l) = 1 −
(−e−ηt )  clµp
t=0 = e
− ηcp lµ , (16)
which is the exponential balking model in [15] with the
exponent of impatience β = ηcp > 0.
B. Rational Reneging
Now we consider the reneging behavior. As we will derive
below, the decision of reneging highly relies on the tenant’s
knowledge of the queue. So we discuss this problem separately
in different cases.
1) Full Knowledge: First, we assume that every tenant is
not only able to observe the position k of its request in the
queue in real time, but also informed by the MNO about
E {wk}. In this case, at every step it will rationally choose
whether to cancel the request (renege) after waiting in the
queue for t, based on the observed queue information:
Dr(t) =
{
1 pτ − c0 − cE{wk(t)} ≥ 0;
0 otherwise,
(17)
where k(t) is the request’s position in the queue, Dr(t) = 1
indicates waiting and Dr(t) = 0 for reneging.
Clearly, k(0) = l so that Eq. (17) becomes Eq. (9) t = 0.
Hence, the maximal waiting time tmax is determined by
pτ − cE{wk(tmax)} = 0, (18)
E{wk} =
k−1∑
i=0
1
µ +
∑i
j=0 ωj
, (19)
where ωi ≥ 0 is the reneging rate at the queue position i for
i > 0 and ω0 = 0. Therefore, this case has an equivalent form
where the MNO informs the tenant that issues the k th request
in queue about µ and ωi for all i < k. The values of µ and
ωi converge to stable levels in long term when the business
scenario remains consistent, therefore we consider them here
as constants that are known by the MNO.
2) Knowledge of Current Position and Serving Rate: In
this case, we assume that every tenant is informed by the
MNO about µ, and keeps observing the position k of its
request in the queue, but has no knowledge about ωi . As a
tenant generally lacks knowledge of requests issued by other
tenants, i.e. the statistics of their parameters [c0, c, p, τ]. So
no tenant is able to estimate the values of ωi in this case,
which disables the estimation of E {wk} according to Eq. (19).
However, knowing that ωi ≥ 0 for all i, the tenants can make
conservative estimations based on
E {wk} =
k−1∑
i=0
1
µ +
∑i
j=0 ωj
≥ k
µ
, (20)
and therefore Eq. (9) becomes
Dr(t) =
{
1 k(t) ≤ µ(pτ−c0)c ;
0 otherwise,
(21)
3) Knowledge of Current Position: In this case, every tenant
is able to track its request’s current position k in queue, but
has no a priori knowledge about µ. Thus, the tenant has to
estimate µ through an online learning process while waiting
in queue:
µˆ(k) = l − k
Tk
, (22)
where Tk is the time that the request took to arrive the k th
position since its entrance to the queue. Thus, Eqs. (20) and
(21) become respectively
E {wˆk} =
k−1∑
i=0
1
µˆ(k) +∑ij=0 ωj ≥ kµˆ(k) = kTkl − k , (23)
Dr(t) =
{
1 k(t) ≤ l(pτ−c0)cTk(t )+pτ−c0 ;
0 otherwise.
(24)
It has to be noted here that the estimation in Eq. (23) is only
valid when k < l, and the estimation error 2µ decreases as k
increases. Therefore a threshold ∆K should be set whereas
µˆ(t) is estimated only when l − k ≥ ∆K . In summary:
Dr (t) =

1 k(t) < l − ∆K,
1 l − ∆K ≤ k(t) ≤ l(pτ−c0)cTk(t )+pτ−c0 ,
0 otherwise.
(25)
4) Knowledge of Mean Waiting Time: In this case, all
tenants are only informed about the average waiting time w
since joining the queue till being served, in which the waiting
time requests that balk and renege do not count. Meanwhile,
the current position in queue k is unobservable for a request
unless k = 0 (i.e. when the request gets served).
In this case, a request can only roughly consider the batch of
all other requests ahead of it as an integrated entity in queue.
As the service to every single request is a Poisson event, we
approximately consider the complete service to this batch (of
unknown length) as a Poisson event with arriving rate of 1/w.
Thus, the reneging decision can be made as
Dr(t) =
{
1 pτ − cw ≥ 0;
0 otherwise,
(26)
Note that Eq. (26) is independent of t or k so that it always
returns the same decision.
5) Blindness: If the tenant possesses neither the position k
of its waiting request in the queue, nor any knowledge about
the dynamics of queue, it can only make a blind reneging,
where a maximal waiting time is predetermined at the queue
entrance. A straightforward solution is to set a maximal cost
proportional to the total profit that can be generated by the
requested slice upon admission:
cmax = c0 + ctmax = αpτ, (27)
where α ≥ 0 is the factor of risking that indicates the tenant’s
intension of waiting in the queue. This yields that
Dr(t) =
{
1 t < αpτ−c0c ,
0 otherwise.
(28)
It is worth to note that when c0 = 0 and τ ∼ Exp(η), the
blind reneging model becomes the classic reneging model [17]
where the maximal waiting time is exponentially distributed.
Furthermore, when α→ +∞ the tenants will never renege and
therefore become patient.
C. Balking with Renaging
When requests are able to renege, the balking behavior
can be considered as a special case of reneging at the queue
entrance (t = 0, k = l). Clearly, this implies to disable balking
in the aforementioned cases III-B3 and III-B5 where no a
priori estimation of E{w} is available for tenants.
IV. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
In the numerical simulations1 we define a simplified sce-
nario, where the MNO holds a normalized two-dimensional
(M = 2) resource pool r = [1, 1] and N = 2 different slice
types are defined and specified with the parameters listed in
Table I.
TABLE I: Specifications of the defined slice types.
Slice Type (n) un λn 1/ηn c0,n cn pn
1 [0.01, 0.05] 6 5 0 1 2
2 [0.05, 0.01] 10 3 0 1 3
Under these specifications, the admissibility region A is
composed of 341 different values of s. For the sake of
simplicity, we do not consider the option of “standby” in the
MNO’s slicing strategy: in this way for every state s only two
different preference vectors, i.e. ϕ1 = [1, 2] and ϕ2 = [2, 1],
are available. Therefore, there are in total 2341 different slicing
strategies applicable for the MNO. We randomly select 1000
from these valid slicing strategies, and with every MNO slicing
strategy, we evaluate the rational balking/reneging strategies
of impatient tenants with different information available. For
every individual evaluation, we simulate the arrivals of tenant
requests and the MNO’s operations for 400 periods.
B. Evaluation Results
During the simulation, we track the end-profit of every
issued slice request defined as follows
pe = pτ − c0 − cw, (29)
where w is the total waiting time from queue entrance to
admission/reneging. Then we evaluate the balking/reneging
strategies of tenants with three different metrics:
• Total profit: the sum of end-profits obtained by all issued
slice requests;
• Mean profit: the average end-profit obtained by all issued
slice requests;
• Profitting rate: the ratio of slice requests that lead to
positive end-profits in all issued requests.
The simulation results are listed in Table II.
It can be easily observed from the results that, given the
knowledge about position of its request in queue and the
queue’s serving rate, a tenant has a high chance to make
correct decisions of balking and reneging. Thereby it is able
1Note that all simulations shown in this work are implemented by means
of Julia [18].
TABLE II: Tenant profits in 400 operation periods under different balking/reneging strategies, “Patient” is the benchmark
strategy where no balking or reneging takes place.
Case Total Profit (×10
3) Mean Profit Profiting Rate
Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2
Patience -37.06 -67.97 -27.72 -55.55 11.12% 11.78%
Blindness
α = 0.05 -1112.51 -5546.10 -27.22 -45.97 0.41% 0.12%
α = 0.5 -1082.35 -5299.60 -29.42 -48.87 0.42% 0.11%
α = 5 -714.00 -3282.84 -38.80 -64.60 0.59% 0.22%
Knowledge of current position (∆K = 3) -97.64 -772.49 -12.23 -19.39 2.17% 0.34%
Knowledge of mean waiting time -55.59 -15.27 -11.14 -14.11 8.28% 26.73%
Knowledge of current position and serving rate 4.21 7.78 9.25 8.78 81.64% 87.15%
Full knowledge 4.42 8.13 9.26 8.83 81.93% 93.40%
to mitigate most losses caused by excessive waiting in case of
request congestion, and thus obtain a positive profit.
The information about reneging rates provides a further
improvement in addition, but only to an insignificant degree.
One reason of this phenomena could be that, after a ratio-
nal balking with sufficient knowledge, the reneging rate of
requests generally remains limited, and therefore it exhibits a
little impact on the waiting time in queue.
In contrast, when provided with only insufficient informa-
tion, most tenants fail to benefit from their impatience. An
impatient tenant knowing only the mean waiting time in queue
can reasonably avoid most extreme long waitings by balking,
and therefore expected to lose less in average, but its chance
to achieve positive profits is not significantly higher than the
patient tenants. When knowing only the current position of
request in queue, an impatient tenant loses even more than
patient ones under request congestions, as it cannot balk but
only renege with an inaccurate estimation of the serving rate.
The worst decisions are made by the blind tenants that renege
after predetermined waiting time, which lead to a negligible
chance of making positive profit and a huge total loss. More
specifically, we can observe a tendency that the performance of
blind reneging increases along with the factor α, approaching
to the upper bound of patience where α→ +∞.
In summary, network slice tenants need information about
queue dynamics from the MNO—at least the minimum in-
formation to enable balking—so that they can benefit from
impatience in case of slice requests congestion. Otherwise, it
is statistically better for the tenants to wait with patience rather
than biding.
C. Distribution of Reneging Time
In Section III-A, we have analytically proven the applica-
bility of various classical models of balking statistics in the
slice admission control scenario upon different distributions of
the slice lifetime τ. The distribution of reneging time in SAC,
however, is relatively challenging to derive in such way.
To evaluate the applicability of existing reneging models,
we execute two additional simulations carrying out for each
of those 1000 times Monte-Carlo test. For both simulations,
the environment is configured to the same specifications listed
in Table I, and the tenants possess full knowledge of the
queuing system. In the first simulation, each test simulates
400 operations periods, where the MNO is always fixed to
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Fig. 3: The distribution of tenant requests’ maximal waiting
time in the scenario of multi-queue slice admission control.
a static admission strategy that ϕ = [2, 1] for all s ∈ A. In
the second simulation, the MNO is set to a random admission
strategy in every Monte-Carlo test. We observe the waiting
time of all reneged requests and illustrate the obtained results
in Fig. 3. Generally, in both simulations and for both slice
types, the maximal waiting time before reneging exhibits a
exponential distribution, which supports applying the classical
model proposed in [17] to simplify queue models from the
MNO’s perspective.
D. Further Discussion
Certainly, when fed with the knowledge of the current active
queues, tenants may be more encouraged to balk or renege
from densely congested queues of slice requests, which in
turn leads to a decreased number of awaiting slice requests.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the phenomena of balking
and reneging are only significant when the queues are consid-
erably long. In this case, the MNO’s resources are already
sufficiently utilized, and the utilization rate is hardly impacted
by the impatience of tenants. On the other hand, if there
is a lack of information about the queues, as demonstrated
in Section IV-B, tenants can suffer from high probability of
business loss. This will, self-evidently, suppress the tenants’
interest for the MNO’s slice service on long-term windows,
leading to a consistent loss of customers from the MNO’s
perspective. In summary, we can argue that it is a win-win
option for the MNO to share full knowledge of the queues, or
at least the request’s current position in queue and the serving
rate of queue, to every awaiting tenant.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we have addressed the network slicing orches-
tration problem from a different perspective: realistic tenant
behaviors to cope with network slice requests congestion. In
particular, we have studied the impatient behavior of net-
work slice tenants in the multi-queue slice admission control
scenario. We have derived the rational behavior models of
tenants in different cases of knowledge, and demonstrated the
applicability of some classical statistical balking and reneging
models in the discussed environment. We have carried out
extended simulations and shown that our results encourage the
network operator (MNO) to fully make available information
of its current queues to the awaiting tenants to benefit both
MNO and tenants in terms of efficiency, waiting time and, in
turn, overall revenues.
As an outlook, the statistical balking and reneging models
that are proven applicable for the Slice-as-a-Service (SlaaS)
paradigm can be taken into account for the design and
optimization of advanced MNO’s admission strategies that
automatically share the queues status while fostering or dis-
couraging tenants from sending additional slice requests.
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